Sports by Siegel, Mark
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School




This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation




1. Baseball Remains Exempt From Antitrust Laws
In the spirit of America's national pastime, it might be appropriate
to say that in a recent Texas district court decision, the defendant
struck out. For over sixty years, a void in the federal antitrust laws has
existed. Baseball, the game that lives in the hearts and minds of mil-
lions of Americans, has been exempt from the set of laws' designed to
prevent the monopolization of interstate commerce. However, in Hen-
derson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n,2 the baseball ex-
emption to antitrust laws was not extended to encompass radio sports
broadcasting.
Defendants Houston Sports Association ("HSA"), owner of the
Houston Astros baseball team, and Lake Huron Broadcasting Corpora-
tion, owner of KENR-AM radio ("KENR"), filed a motion to dismiss
plaintiff Henderson Broadcasting Corporation's complaint.3 The plain-
tiff, also known as KYST-AM ("KYST"), brought an action against
defendants for injunctive relief and $2.5 million claiming violations of
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and the Texas antitrust laws, as
well as breach of contract, inducing the repudiation of a contract and
interference with business relationships.4 Relying on the baseball ex-
emption, HSA and KENR sought to terminate the litigation by making
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Civil
Procedure Rule 12(b)(6).5
The complaint sought to reestablish KYST's legal rights to broad-
cast Astro baseball games. HSA allegedly entered into contracts with
both KYST and KENR, two competitors in the Houston-Galveston ra-
dio broadcasting market. HSA was then said to have breached its con-
tract with KYST as part of a conspiracy with KENR so that HSA could
monopolize the advertising revenue and listening audiences in the area.
1. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Base-
ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). Plaintiff baseball team was one of eight members of the
Federal League of Professional Baseball Clubs. Defendants, National and American
Leagues of Professional Baseball Clubs, were accused of conspiring to destroy plaintiff's
league by inducing Federal League teams, except plaintiff, to leave the Federal League and
join defendant's leagues.
2. 541 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
3. Id. at 264.
4. Id.
5. Id.
LO YOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
Without rights to broadcast the Astro games, KYST would lose a sig-
nificant number of listeners resulting in a loss of advertisers and adver-
tising revenue.6
KYST's allegation that radio comprised a significant portion of
HSA's business, some of which was interstate commerce, placed this
activity in the realm of federal antitrust laws.7 In bringing their motion
to dismiss, KENR and HSA had the difficult burden of proving that
the acts KYST complained of were exempt or immune from these
laws.8 KENR and HSA did not overcome the presumption against ex-
emption. In ruling against defendants, the court articulated three lines
of analysis to demonstrate that radio broadcasting was not to follow on
the coattails of the baseball exemption: 1) The Supreme Court "has
implied that broadcasting is not central enough to baseball to be en-
compassed in the baseball exemption"; 2) Congress has not seen fit to
accord the exemption to radio broadcasting, and 3) Lower federal
courts have not exempted other baseball-related commercial activity
which, like broadcasting, do not involve the actual business of the
game.9
Henderson was a case of first impression. The Texas district court
had no precedent which directly confronted the issue of whether or not
radio broadcasting was to be included within the baseball exemption.
Consequently, although the issue in the case involved broadcasting and
not the baseball industry, the underlying theme of the opinion was that
the entire baseball exemption exists on such precarious grounds today l
that extending it would "distort the specific baseball exemption.""
The Supreme Court created the baseball exemption in Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs'2 for two reasons. First, the business of baseball was
not considered to be interstate commerce. 13 The most visible interstate
aspect of the game when Federal Baseball was decided in 1922 was the
6. Id. at 264 n.2.
7. Id. at 263-64. In Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, the Court stated that a proper
allegation that a substantial amount of profit is derived from radio and television is "suffi-
cient to meet the commerce requirements of the Act." 352 U.S. 445, 453 (1975).
8. 541 F. Supp. at 265.
9. Id. The business of the game refers to such matters as a reserve clause in a player's
contract, player's rights in a trade agreement and league rules.
10. The court used such words as "aberration" and "anachronism" to accompany the
idea of baseball's exemption. Id. at 269, 272.
11. Henderson, 541 F. Supp. at 271 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
12. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
13. In Federal Baseball, Justice Holmes said that "[t]he business is giving exhibitions of
baseball, which are purely state affairs." 259 U.S. at 208.
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travel involved when two teams got together to play in a certain city.
This interstate aspect, however, was considered incidental and not sub-
stantial enough to challenge the local character of the business.' 4 Sec-
ondly, the sport of baseball could not be considered trade or commerce
since the game involves expending personal effort, an attribute not con-
sidered to be commerce. 5
Over the three decades following the Federal Baseball decision,
radio and television broadcasting greatly expanded, enabling more
sports fans than ever before to sit at home and enjoy the game without
having to fight the traffic at the ballparts, or risk getting hit over the
head with a bag of peanuts thrown by a sluggish vendor. However,
expanded media coverage of baseball games did not prompt the
Supreme Court in Toolson v. New York, Inc. 6 to life the exemption.
The impact of broadcasting was not at issue in Toolson 7 although the
dissent noted the increased revenues generated from radio and televi-
sion. 8 It was clear that the Court was waiting for Congress to legislate
on the baseball exemption and was not going to overrule Federal Base-
ball even if its original premise, exempting baseball, no longer seemed
valid.' 9
The last Supreme Court case to date that dealt with the baseball
exemption 20 again refused to end the anomalous exemption, although
it did criticize and finally contradict Federal Baseball by proclaiming
that baseball was a business engaged in interstate commerce. 2' Hender-
son concluded that the Kuhn Court might have overruled Federal Base-
ball if it had believed that broadcasting was more central to the
game.22 Therefore, in denying the motion to dismiss, the Henderson
court pointed to language in Kuhn that implies that broadcasting
14. Id. at 209.
15. "[P]ersonal effort, not related to production, is not a subject of commerce." Id.
16. 346 U.S. 356 (1953), reh'g denied, 346 U.S. 917 (1953).
17. Toolson involved the reserve clauses in baseball players' contracts and league-wide
agreements which were both said to have deprived players of services and the opportunity
for advancement. Id. at 362-64.
18. Id. at n.1.
19. Toolson, in a half-page decision made clear that "[w]e think that if there are evils in
this field which now warrant application to it of the antitrust laws it should be by legisla-
tion." Id. at 357.
20. In Flood v. Kuhn, antitrust laws were allegedly violated when a St. Louis Cardinals
center fielder was traded without his consultation and was prevented from negotiating his
own trade. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
21. The Court stated that since professional baseball "is a business... engaged in in-
terstate commerce," it is an "exception and an anamoly ... an aberration." 407 U.S. at
282.
22. The Court in Kuhn stated, "ft]he advent of radio and television with their conse-
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should not be encompassed in the baseball exemption if, alternatively,
radio and television coverage would not warrant ending the baseball
exemption.
According to Henderson, an "important decision"23 by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals lended support for not exempting HSA and
KENR. In Gardella v. Chandler,24 the Federal Baseball decision was
distinguished on the grounds that modern radio and television accounts
of games may make baseball exhibitions interstate commerce. The cir-
cuit court took the bold step of remanding the case back to the district
court which had previously dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. 5
Judge Hand wanted the district court to determine whether the modern
media "together with any other interstate activities marked the business
as a whole," thus subjecting it to antitrust laws. 6 Gardella merely
lends more support to KYST's opposition to dismissal. The relation-
ship between broadcasting and the baseball exemption was left up in
the air in Gardella due to a quick settlement after the circuit court's
ruling.
After analyzing the line of Supreme Court cases dealing with the
exemption, the Henderson court was frank in stating that "[tihe fact
that interstate broadcasting on the one hand has subjected other profes-
sional sports to the antitrust laws, but on the other hand has not af-
fected the baseball exemption, is perplexing. '"27 Today, baseball is the
only professional sport which is granted immunity from the federal an-
titrust laws.28 The Henderson court rationalized this by repeating that
"broadcasting is not central enough to the 'unique characteristics and
needs' of baseball which the exemption was created to protect. 29
However, the court determined that the more reasonable interpretation
is that the baseball exemption is an "aberration" and the court "should
leave the aberration as it finds it, on the narrow ground of stare
quent increased coverage and additional revenues has not occasioned an overruling of Fed-
eral Baseball and Toolson." 407 U.S. at 281.
23. 541 F. Supp. at 267.
24. In Gardella a New York Giants player was barred from baseball for several years
after he violated terms of the reserve clause contained in his contract when he played profes-
sional baseball in Mexico. 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
25. The original grounds for baseball immunity seemed jurisdictionally based on an
absence of interstate commerce.
26. 172 F.2d at 408.
27. 541 F. Supp. at 268.
28. See Haywood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n., 401 U.S. 1204 (1971) (basketball);
Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, reh'g denied, 353 U.S. 931 (1957) (foot-
ball); U.S. v. Int'l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955) (boxing).




While precedent was hard to come by, the Henderson court found
it equally difficult to find guidance from Congressional action, since
Congress has not legislated on the issue of exempting radio broadcast-
ing from the antitrust laws.3' Whenever Congress has come close to
addressing the issue, it has not extended the baseball exemption to ra-
dio.32 The only legislation which has exempted any aspect of profes-
sional sports dealt with the merger of professional football leagues and
pooled telecasting of games in the top four sports markets.33 Based on
an overview of Congressional action, or lack thereof, the Henderson
court found no support for HSA and KENR's position.
The defendants' position also fell short when viewed against other
lower federal court decisions which touched upon the subject of the
baseball exemption in relation to the business which markets the game.
In recent baseball antitrust cases, when issues involved "contracts be-
tween baseball teams or players on the one hand and non-exempt busi-
ness enterprises on the other, no court has granted a dismissal on the
grounds that baseball is implicated. '34 Henderson discussed a case in-
volving a stadium concession contract which tied the owner of the Oak-
land A's to the concessionaire for 20 years, 35 and another case alleging
that a chewing gum company violated antitrust laws in the sale of base-
ball cards. 36 The baseball exemption was not raised as a defense in
either case. The Henderson court reasoned that if the baseball exemp-
tion was not raised in these other cases which litigated revenue-produc-
ing areas of baseball, such as a broadcasting contract, then no
30. Id. at 269.
31. Id.
32. A 1952 House Subcommittee Report was weary of any broad exemption which
would have adverse effects on the antitrust laws. House Comm. on the Study on Monopoly
Power, Organized Baseball, H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 230 (1952). A 1965
Senate Subcommittee was willing to go as far as exempting the "essential sports practices" of
baseball, football, basketball and hockey, but was unwilling to exempt the "business prac-
tices" of these sports. Professional Sports Act of 1965, S. Rep. No. 462, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
1 (1965).
33. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-94 (1982). The exemption accorded television was for the
purpose of assuring weaker teams a percentage of television rvenue; revenue that without
the exemption would most likely go to the stronger teams. In this way the League structure
could be maintained. 541 F. Supp. at 269-70.
34. 541 F. Supp. at 269-70. The court also pointed out that in such cases jurisdictional
challenges were not even raised.
35. Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 365 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Cal.
1972), rev'don other grounds, 512 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1975).
36. Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 658 F.2d 139 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1019 (1982).
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justification existed for the exemption to be brought up in the case at
hand.
The Henderson court was placed in a precarious position of decid-
ing an issue not directly addressed by any previous legal sources. The
implications derived from federal court decisions and congressional
law-making left no doubt that the baseball exemption was meant to
encompass only those aspects of the game itself and not those related to
the business end.37 HSA and KENR contended that radio broadcast-
ing was "so much a part of baseball that it, as well as baseball, was
exempt from the antitrust laws."3 8 Assuming this were true, their mo-
tion was still improper according to the reasoning in Henderson. To a
large extent, other professional sports have not been exempted from
antitrust laws because broadcasting was so bound up with the success
or failure of the sport itself.39 For example, the Supreme Court has
found the volume of interstate business in football to be greater than
the volume in baseball.' It is this volume of interstate transmissions
which makes football profitable.4' Yet, during baseball season, fans
are able to see and hear nationally transmitted games throughout the
season whether they are on Monday nights, Saturday mornings, the
playoffs or the World Series. Seemingly this activity by broadcasters
should have lifted baseball's exemption back in the early innings, but it
has not. Therefore, in order for Federal Baseball's rationale to hold
any meaning today, interstate broadcasting must not be deemed so
much a part of the game as "to color the whole" of baseball, otherwise
it would thrust the game within the scope of antitrust laws.42 In other
words, the Astros were placed in a no-win situation. If broadcasting is
so central to the game, as to "color the whole," then this activity would
justify eliminating baseball's exemption. On the other hand, if broad-
casting is not important enough to baseball so as to place it within the
realm of antitrust laws, then it is certainly not bound up enough with
37. At first glance, it may seem incorrect to exempt the game of baseball and not one of
its primary sources of revenue. However, one must keep in mind that antitrust laws exist to
promote competition. The original purpose of exempting baseball and the exemption ac-
corded television under 15 U.S.C. § 1291 are not and have never been based on the same
premise as HSA and KENR proposed to the Texas district court.
38. 541 F. Supp. at 268.
39. It is difficult to see why broadcasting today is so much more important in other
sports than it is in baseball. Although neither the courts or Congress has acted, this does not
mean that the baseball exemption remains valid.
40. Radovich 352 U.S. at 451-52.
41. Id. at 449.
42. Gardella, supra note 25. In Gardella, Judge Hand seriously questioned baseball's
exemption in light of modem radio and television. Id.
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the game so as to justify including broadcasting within baseball's
exemption.
Because radio broadcasting was not exempt from antitrust laws
before Henderson ,' the decision will not send as many repercussions
through the sports industry as those sent up one's arm when hitting a
foul ball off the end of a baseball bat. Judging from the type of motion
they made, it appears that HSA and KENR sought to terminate the
litigation with a long-shot proposition which the court dismissed with
the weight of indirect authority. Although the court set forth the rule
that radio broadcasting would not be exempt from antitrust laws, the
decision's real impact merely drives another nail into the coffin of the
baseball exemption. As the district court concluded: "[tihe baseball
exemption today is an anachronism. Defendants have not presented a
reason to extend it."'  HSA and KENR's motion "fanned" on three
pitches: Supreme Court interpretations, Congressional inaction and
lower federal court decisions. As far as the baseball exemption is con-
cerned, the Henderson court signals that the "anachronism" may be
facing the bottom of the ninth inning.
Remy Kessler
2. Cross-Ownershoi Ban
The North American Soccer League successfully opposed the Na-
tional Football League's attempt to require team owners to divest
themselves of holdings in professional baseball, basketball, hockey, and
soccer. In North American Soccer League v. NFL,' the court held the
proposed amendment to the NFL's constitution 2 to be a violation of the
rule of reason as extrapolated from section one of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act.3
"Professional sports leagues present a unique form of economic
organization, whose members must compete fiercely in some respects
and cooperate in others."4 The structure is economically justified be-
43. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1982).
44. 541 F. Supp. at 272.
1. 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982), af#'g in part, rev'g in part, 505 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 499, 74 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1982).
2. The proposed cross-ownership ban is reproduced in 505 F. Supp. at 661-62.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
4. Note, The Super Bowl and the Sherman Act.: Professional Team Sports and the Anti-
trust Laws, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 418, 419 (1967). "The legal problems [arising from] that 'be-
deviling hybrid' . . . cut across every aspect of the sports business .... ." Riley, "In the
1984]
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cause it makes possible a product, major league sports.'
The NASL came into existence in 1968. It grew erratically until
1974, but achieved dramatic increases in growth from 1975 through
1978.6 The NFL, a giant of the industry, has opposed cross-ownership
since the 1950's. 7 NFL resolutions in 1967, 1972, 1974, 1976, and 1977
urged NFL team owners to divest themselves of holdings in other pro-
fessional sports teams.8 Nonetheless, cross-ownership persisted. In
particular, Lamar Hunt, owner of the Kansas City Chiefs and the Dal-
las Tornados, and the Robbie family, owners of the Miami Dolphins
and the Fort Lauderdale Strikers, continued to expand their holdings,9
much to the chagrin of their fellow NFL team owners."
In 1978, the NFL sought to put teeth into its policy with a flat
prohibition on cross-ownership, supported by economic sanctions and
extending the prohibition to the relatives of NFL team owners." The
ban would have required Hunt and the Robbie family to divest them-
selves of NASL holdings.' 2 At the hearing for a preliminary injunc-
tion,13 the NASL claimed that it was already injured in the loss of
prospective investors,14 and that the threat to the NASL's stability jeop-
ardized broadcasting negotiations."
The NFL contended that the purpose of the ban was to preserve
commercial confidentiality and public confidence, and to prevent
"creeping merger[s]" through joint ownership. 6 The narrow issue was
Front Court for the NBA," Nat'l L. J., January 2, 1984, a 28, col. 2 (quoting NBA Comm'r-
elect, David Stem).
5. Note, supra note 4 at 420.
6. Moynihan, North American Soccer League v. National Football League: Applying
"Rule of Reason" Analysis under the Sherman Act to Private Bans on Cross-Ownership, 15
New Eng. L. Rev. 697, 703 (1980).
7. 505 F. Supp. at 669.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 669-670.
10. In particular, Leonard Tose of the Philadelphia Eagles and Max Winter of the Min-
nesota Vikings. 670 F.2d at 1254.
11. Moynihan, supra note 6, at 706.
12. L. Sobel, Professional Sports and the Law, § 5.5 at 67 (Supp. 1981). Lamar Hunt has
been characterized as "unquestionably the most powerful force in the founding, survival,
and expected growth of professional soccer in the United States." Moynihan, supra note 6,
at 734.
13. 465 F. Supp. 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
14. Specifically, Carroll Rosenbloom of the Los Angeles Rams and Ranken Smith of the
Atlanta Falcons. Moynihan, supra note 6, at 712 n. 91.
15. Id. at 707.
16. L. Sobel, supra note 12, § 5.5 at 67 (Supp. 1981). Moynihan stated that the ban
would be procompetitive only if cross-ownership would inhibit season expansion and direct
competition between teams of different leagues. Moynihan, supra note 6 at 732-34. Moyni-
han discounted any procompetitive effect because franchise owners are likely to seek econo-
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whether it was reasonable to exclude twenty-eight NFL team owners
and their families from the market for sports ownership investment
capital. "
The trial court made no definite finding as to the breadth of the
market, but characterized the individual investor in professional sports
as the "sportsman,"' 8 an individual with a lot of risk capital and a love
of sport and the limelight. 9 Such individuals come "from various
walks of life, . . . frequently without prior experience in the field."2
The NFL forbids corporate ownership unless the corporation's primary
business purpose is to run a football team,2 but corporate ownership is
relatively common elsewhere in the industry.22
The trial court granted a preliminary injunction against the ban
because the NASL had demonstrated a substantial risk of immediate
irreparable harm and the existence of sufficiently serious merits to
make them a fair ground for litigation.23 The trial court discounted the
NFL's claims that it would be injured because of its eleven year delay
in acting to enforce the policy.
24
Nonetheless, "in the light of discovery and a full trial record,"25
the court determined that the NFL acted as a single entity in the invest-
ment capital market.26 Therefore, it was not subject to the Sherman
mies of scale in the fuller use of stadia. Id. Moynihan criticizes the ban as underinclusive in
not prohibiting interests in other businesses and overinclusive in banning cross-ownership
rather than imposing a more limited form of oversight. Id. at 737-38.
17. Moynihan stated that, absent "supply substitution, the NFL market power would be
obviously substantial." Moynihan, supra note 6 at 725.
18. The trial court might also have identified the "sportswoman," e.g., Susan Tose
Fletcher, a lawyer recently designated Leonard Tose's heir apparent, and Georgia Frontiere,
a former vaudeville singer and chorus girl who inherited the Los Angeles Rams in 1979. See
Janofsky, Boss's Daughter Takes Firm Command of Eagles, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1983, at
CII, col. 1.
19. 505 F. Supp. at 665. Such "sportsmen" include Leonard Tose, chairman of an inter-
state trucking company who acquired control of the Philadelphia Eagles; Peter Pocklington,
an Albertan businessman who acquired the Edmonton Oilers through a "casual exchange
with a friend"; Edward Bennett Williams, attorney for owners of the Washignton Redskins,
who acquired control of the team; and Lamar Hunt, who, largely on inherited wealth, ac-
quired the Dallas franchise and the Kansas City NFL franchise. Id.
20. Id. Ironically, Lamar Hunt, the firebrand of the NASL (see n. 13, supra), founded
the AFL without prior experience. Sobel, supra note 12 § 6.1(a) at 382.
21. 505 F. Supp. at 667-68.
22. Id. at 665-66. There were eight corporate owners in the NASL, three in the NBA,
eight in the NHL, and ten in major league baseball. Id.
23. 465 F. Supp. at 668.
24. Id. at 677.
25. 505 F. Supp. at 671.
26. Id. at 677.
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Act.27
The Second Circuit rejected the "single entity" reasoning of the
trial court. "To tolerate such a loophole would permit league members
to escape antitrust responsibility for any restraint. . . that would bene-
fit their league [regardless of] its anticompetitive effects."' 28 Further, the
court characterized the amendment as a "strong action' against Hunt
and the Robbies.29 In light of the protests of individual team owners
who instigated the ban, the objective was not to protect the NFL, but
individual teams.3°
The cross-ownership ban was not a violation per se because a
weak league might be justified in barring an abuse by uncommitted
owners. 3' The question, then, was whether the ban promoted more
than inhibited competition.
The trial court had not defined the limits of the sports investment
capital market,32 but the ban was intended to foreclose the growth of
the NASL by forbidding it access to "a significant segment of the mar-
ket supply . . . . 33 That market was not limited to current owners,
but the record disclosed a separate market and a need for active, exper-
ienced owners. Current owners were, therefore, a significant portion of
the market.34
The history of nonenforcement of the policy belied the NFL's
claim that the ban was necessary to preserve the undivided loyalty of
franchise owners.35 The court suggested the less restrictive alternative
of barring cross-owners from negotiations for the sale of broadcasting
rights.36 The court conceded that there was some merit to the NFL's
contention that cross-ownership could lead to collusion and a greater
restraint on trade than the ban, but saw no substantial threat in this
possibility.37 In short, the NFL had not demonstrated a legitimate pur-
pose for the ban.
The Sherman Antitrust Act provides that, "[elvery contract, com-
bination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . is declared to be
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
28. 670 F.2d at 1257, citing, Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States, 246
U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
29. Id. at 1254.
30. Id. at 1257.
31. Id. at 1258-59.
32. Id. at 1256.
33. Id. at 1259.
34. Id. at 1260.





illegal."38 Taken literally, the statute would bar all contracts, because
every agreement, in some sense, restrains trade.39 The rule of reason
analysis determines whether an agreement merely regulates and
thereby promotes trade, or inhibits it.' The analysis requires an inves-
tigation of the particular business and the purpose and effect of the
restraint.4
Professional sports leagues compete for players,42 for stadia, 3 for
cities,' and for owners.45 In the market for territories, sports leagues
have been deemed single entities. In San Francisco Seals, Ltd v.
NHL,4 the Seals sought to invalidate the NHL's territory regulations.
The court looked to the extent of the relevant market 47 and stated that
the teams were not competitors in an economic sense and that the terri-
torial regulation "ma[de] possible a segment of commercial activity
which could hardly exist without it."
48
The competition for players, however, is clearly among the teams
in a given league. In Smith v. Pro Football, Inc. ,4 the court invalidated
the NFL draft, as it existed in 1968, for purposefully limiting competi-
tion among teams for college graduates.5 ° Even so, one judge on that
court argued that the teams were not in economic competition" and
that the draft brought about benefits which inured even to the
52players.
2
Missing, however, from Seals and Smith was the potential for an
anticompetitive impact on another league. The NFL may have acted
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
39. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
40. Id.
41. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1972).
42. Sobel, supra note 12 § 5.2 (1977).
43. Id., § 5.3.
44. Id., § 5.4.
45. Id., § 5.5, 66-68 (Supp. 1981).
46. 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
47. Id. at 968-69, citing, United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377,
395 (1956); and Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
48. 379 F. Supp. at 969-70. Ironically, the Seals wanted to move to Vancouver, where
there was no NHL team. The NHL's prohibition, therefore, was arguably unreasonable.
Had there been a team already in Vancouver, the NHL's prohibition on the Seals' move
would clearly have been reasonable. In that situation, however, given the potential for inter-
team competition, the court might have invalidated the NHL's prohibition. Sobel, supra
note 12 § 8.2(b) at 502-03.
49. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
50. Id. at 1185-86.
51. Id. at 1195 (MacKinnon, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part).
52. Id. at 1201.
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as a single entity, 3 but a group cannot escape antitrust liability by
adopting a membership plan.54 It must still pass muster under the rule
of reason.
It is beyond the scope of this note to measure the impact the ban
would have had on the NASL,55 and neither the trial court nor the
Second Circuit defined the market for sports investment capital.56 Mr.
Justice Rehnquist believed that the Second Circuit "engaged in exces-
sive speculation. . ." and that the Court ought to have remanded the
case to the trial court, whose job the rule of reason analysis is.57 Be-
yond that, however, the rule of reason analysis "often requires difficult
factual inquiries and subjective policy judgments which are more ap-
propriate . . ." for Congress than the courts.58
The NFL may yet attempt to reinstate its traditional policy in a
less draconian form.59 Indeed, it has already objected to Edward
DeBartolo, Sr. and Jr., owning franchises in the NFL and the USFL on
the ground of conflict of interest.6 ° The NFL would more likely prefer,
however, the finality of an Act of Congress.
The NFL has succeeded in lobbying efforts in the past. It secured
authorization for the AFL/NFL merger and the sale of broadcasting
package contracts61 in a scant seventy-two days of lobbying.62 Com-
missioner Pete Rozelle has urged Congress to view the NFL as a single
entity, but the focus of its more recent lobbying has been the Raiders'
move from Oakland to Los Angeles.63
53. Justice Rehnquist viewed the cross-ownership ban as analogous to a reasonably re-
strictive noncompetition covenant. - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 501-02, citing, United States
v. Addyston, 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898). A noncompetition covenant among joint ventur-
ers is valid under antitrust law if the restraint is ancillary to the main purpose of a legitimate
contract and necessary to protect the covenantee's legitimate property interests. Id. See
Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921
(1982).
54. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19 (1944).
55. See, however, Moynihan, supra note 6 and Harv. L. Rev., supra note 4.
56. See supra notes 33-35.
57. - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 499-500, citing, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); and Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263,
302 (2d Cir. 1979). The court of appeal is bound by the district court's findings of fact and
"cannot weight complex antitrust evidence de novo ." Lektro- Vend, at 262.
58. Linseman v. World Hockey Assn., 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (1977). See also United
States v. Topco at 609 and 611-12 (Brennan, J., concurring).
59. The courts in NASL, 670 F.2d at 1261, and Smith v. Pro Football, 593 F.2d at 1188,
allowed for less restrictive alternatives.
60. "DeBartolo Family is Standing Firm," N.Y. Times, June 29, 1983, at P8, col. 1.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). See Sobel, §§ 6.1(a) through 6.1(c) (1977).
62. L. Sobel, § 10.2(b)(l) at 585.
63. See "N.A.S.L. Opposes Bill It Says Favors N.F.L.," N.Y. Times, March 2, 1982, at
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The application of antitrust laws to professional sports remains
unsettled. Professional baseball retains a peculiar exemption from an-
titrust law, a vestige of an ancient interpretation of commerce.64 The
Supreme Court adheres to it because Congress has not acted to remove
it.6
5
The last attempt of either House to enact comprehensive sports
antitrust legislation was in 1965.66 Congress' authorization for the
AFL/NFL merger and the sale of package broadcasting rights67 was
expressly limited to those two areas.68 The Ninety-Eighth Congress has
produced four bills relating to sports antitrust law. One would simply
remove baseball's antitrust exemption,69 while the other three narrowly
address the relocation of teams, a clear response to the Raiders' move
to Los Angeles.7' Two of these bills expressly state that the act will not
"exempt from the antitrust laws any predatory practice . . . against
other leagues.7'
The cross-ownership ban, as it was drawn in 1978, is probably a
dead letter. Still, Congress's piecemeal approach to sports antitrust law




3. NFL's Home Game Black- Out Exemption
Agreements by a professional football league to pool and sell the
television rights of its member teams enjoy a statutory exemption from
B8, col. 6; "Rozelle Seeking Change," N.Y. times, august 17, 1982, at D23, col. 1; "David v.
Goliath?," N.Y. times, August 27, 1982, at A 10, col. 1; Sinnot, "Case For and Against N.F.L.
Antitrust Exemption: Needed to Protect Cities," N.Y. Times, March 6, 1983, § 5 at 2, col. 1;
and Hecht, "Case For and Against N.F.L. Antitrust Exemption: It Threatens Free Enter-
prise," id., col. 3. See also Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 634 F.2d 1197
(9th Cir. 1980), rev'g, 468 F. Supp. 154 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
64. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284 (1972). See id. at 281-82 for a summary of legisla-
tive efforts to deal with baseball's antitrust exemption. See also Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S.
445, 456 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (urging extension of baseball's antitrust exemption to
professional football under stare decisis).
65. Flood, supra note 64.
66. L. Sobel, § 1.2(c)(5) (1977).
67. See supra note 61.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 1294 (1976).
69. H.R. 3094, 98th Cong., 1st Session (1983).
70. H.R. 2041, S. 1078, S. 1036, 98th Cong., 1st Session (1983).
71. S. 1036 § 3(c), H.R. 2041 § 3(c).
72. "Rozelle Seeking Change," N.Y. Times, August 17, 1982, a D23, col. I (quoting
NFL Comm'r Rozelle).
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the application of the antitrust laws.I This exemption does not apply to
any agreement that attempts to prohibit the televising of games within
a particular area of the country.2 However, the league may restrict, by
agreement, the televising of a game within the home territory of a club
which is playing at home.3
In WTWV, Inc. v. National Football League, the court was asked
to define the word "televising" in this context.4 If televising means
originating signal, then a blackout of a local game would be permitted
only when the television transmitter was located within the home terri-
tory. If, on the other hand, televising refers to the area a signal is re-
ceived, a blackout would be permitted even though a television
transmitter is located outside of the home territory. In this respect, a
blackout would be concomitant with the physical boundaries of a
team's home territory irregardless of where the signal originates. The
court held that signal penetration rather than station location was the
focus of the controlling exemption.'
The NFL By-laws are consistent with the antitrust exemption pro-
vided in section 1292; they prohibit telecasts of home games within a
club's territory except by agreement between participating teams. The
NFL's Constitution and By-laws define "home territory" as "the sur-
rounding territory to the extent of 75 miles in every direction" from the
city limits of the club's franchise city.
6
WTWV, Inc. owns and operates television station WTVX located
near Miami, Florida. WTVX was viewed within a relatively small area
before it began broadcasting from a more powerful transmitter located
96 miles north of Miami. This transmitter's signal penetrated 40 miles
into the Miami Dolphins' home territory. After WTVX switched to the
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) provides in part:
The antitrust laws. . . shall not apply to any joint agreement by or among persons
engaging in or conducting the organized professional team sports of football, base-
ball, basketball, or hockey, by which any league of clubs participating in profes-
sional football, baseball, basketball, or hockey contests sells or otherwise transfers
all or any part of the rights of such league's member clubs in the sponsored tele-
casting of the games . . . engaged in or conducted by such clubs.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1292 (1976) provides:
Section 1291 of this title shall not apply to any joint agreement described in the
first sentence in such section which prohibits any person to whom such rights are
sold or transferred from televising any games within any area, except within the
home territory of a member club of the league on a day when such club is playing a
game at home.
3. Id.
4. 678 F.2d 142 (11th Cir. 1982).
5. Id. at 146.
6. Id. at 143.
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more powerful transmitter, the Dolphins refused authorization for
WTVX to broadcast its unsold-out home games.
WTWV brought suit against the NFL and Miami Dolphins for
damages and injunctive relief alleging violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Because its station and transmitter was located well
outside the Dolphins' home territory, WTWV claimed that the black-
out was not within the antitrust exemption. The lower court, however,
agreed with the NFL that the blackout was proper noting that signal
penetration rather than station location determines which television
stations are televising within a club's home territory.'
The court of appeals, in affirming this statutory construction,
based its decision on the purpose of section 1292. "The broadcast ex-
emption from the antitrust laws was intended to preserve the existence
of the NFL by shielding its members from a decline in attendance due
to televising games in the area from which spectators are drawn."8
This purpose necessarily "requires that the antitrust exemption focus
on where the potential ticket buyers would receive the signal, not where
it came from."
Further, the court rebutted WTWV's contention that the district
court erred in not following established principles of statutory con-
struction.9 In support of its contention, WTWV cited Supreme Court
cases which noted that antitrust exemptions should be narrowly con-
strued.'o A narrow construction in this case would require station loca-
tion rather than signal penetration to trigger the exemption in section
1292.
However, the court was not persuaded. Although an antitrust ex-
emption should be narrowly construed, precedent does not mandate it
be given the narrowest possible interpretation." Therefore, the princi-
ples of statutory construction do not require televising to be defined by
station location rather than signal penetration.
WTWV also contended that facts contemporaneous with the stat-
ute's enactment supported the station location interpretation. In col-
lege football, Congress specifically utilized a station location rule in
7. WTWV, Inc. v. National Football League, No. 80-8306-Civ-JCP (S.D. Fla. July 21,
1981).
8. 678 F.2d at 145-46.
9. Id. at 144-45.
10. Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231 (1979);
Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Association, 425 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1976).
11. Abbott, 425 U.S. at 1, 11-12 (Supreme Court adopted a broader reading of statutory
exemption than court of appeals).
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giving blackout protection.' 2 This, WTWV claimed, evidenced con-
gressional intent to require the station location interpretation in similar
statutes. The court rejected WTWV's claim, reasoning that "U]ust as
Congress may have intended the same interpretation but used different
language, so too may Congress have used different language to indicate
a different interpretation." 3
The court's decision and reasoning are sound. Technological ad-
vances in the transmission of television signals would completely oblit-
erate the home territory shield Congress provided if the court accepted
the station location interpretation. WTWV is itself an example of this.
Its station was 96 miles outside of Miami. Yet, it penetrated 40 miles
into the Dolphins' home territory. Allowing WTWV or any other sta-
tion outside the 75 mile limit to transmit into a club's home territory
would subvert the exemption and render it meaningless. Therefore, the
court was correct in finding that signal penetration rather than station
location determines the boundaries of the antitrust exemption.
The court, however, did not define signal penetration. It did find
that WTVX's signal penetrated 40 miles into the Dolphins' home terri-
tory because of its new, more powerful transmitter. ' 4 This suggests that
the standard for determining signal penetration is based on the pro-
jected distance of a signal's transmission.
Technological advances have not only been made in the transmis-
sion of television signals. Consumers now have the option of purchas-
ing television "dish" receptors which greatly enhance television
reception. The court here was only faced with determining the NFL's
blackout rights with regard to the transmission and not the reception of
signals. This leaves open the question of whether the NFL can refuse
authorization of the telecast, because of the viewers' ability to receive
television signals.
The court implicitly suggested that it would uphold the NFL's
right to refuse authorization of a telecast because of viewers' ability to
receive television signals in the home territory. The court has labeled
the NFL's refusal to authorize telecasting of games a "fundamental
property right."' 5 With respect to section 1292, the court stated that the
statute was "merely (a) a confirmation of the NFL's television rights
and not an antitrust exemption."' 6 Given this expansive viewpoint, the
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1293 (1976).
13. 678 F.2d at 145.
14. Id. at 143.




court would allow the NFL to limit or refuse to authorize the telecast-
ing of games based not only on the power of television stations' trans-
mitters, but also on the ability of the viewing public to receive
television signals. Thus, the court's reasoning implicitly suggests a
broad definition of signal penetration as well as a broad definition of
the NFL's right to refuse authorization of a telecast.
Paul Griener
4. NFL's Membership Admissions Procedure
Professional football is not as fortunate as professional baseball
with regard to antitrust laws; professional football does not enjoy total
exemption from antitrust laws.' In Mid-South Grizzlies v. National
Football League, the court considered whether the NFL's membership
admission procedures violated section 1 or section 2 of the Sherman
Act. 2 The court held that the NFL's refusal to accept, or to even con-
sider, a qualified application for membership in the league did not vio-
late either section of the antitrust laws.
3
The dispute originated in late 1975 when the Mid-South Grizzlies
applied to the NFL in the hope of obtaining a franchise for the Mem-
phis, Tennessee area.4 Representatives of the Grizzlies discussed their
application in December of 1975 with the NFL Expansion Committee.
Investigation and planning for additional NFL teams was the responsi-
bility of this committee.' The committee explained to the Grizzlies that
further expansion of the NFL was, at that time, unwise. Also, the
Committee stated that they would advise the full NFL membership to
consider no further expansion.
The Grizzlies attempted to persuade the NFL two more times.
One time the entire NFL membership was present. The NFL re-
sponded a few months later by passing a resolution which reaffirmed
the committee's recommendation of no further expansion. The resolu-
1. Professional baseball is totally exempt from antitrust laws. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S.
258 (1972).
2. 550 F. Supp. 558, 560 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
3. [d at 571-72.
4. The plaintiff, the Mid-South Grizzlies, was a joint business venture which included
the Mid-South Grizzlies, a Tennessee limited partnership, Consolidated Industries, Inc., a
California corporation, and John Edward Bosacco, an individual.
5. The NFL Expansion Committee at the time of plaintiffs' application, consisted of
the following members: Daniel M. Rooney, President of the Pittsburgh Steelers, Gerald H.
Phipps of the Denver Broncos, Louis Spadia of the San Francisco '49ers, and Texas
Schramm of the Dallas Cowboys.
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tion stated that due to the major problems confronting the NFL at that
time6 a commitment to expansion would not be prudent.7 However,
the resolution reassured the Grizzlies that they would receive serious
consideration in the future when definite expansion plans were formu-
lated.8 The NFL, because it had already decided against expansion
anywhere, never fully considered the merits of the Grizzlies'
application.
Exhausting their possibilities of obtaining a franchise through the
NFL's application procedures, in December of 1979 the Grizzlies filed
this suit. The Grizzlies charged that the NFL's actions established an
unlawful group boycott and an unreasonable restraint of trade in viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act.9 Also, the Grizzlies asserted that
the procedures practiced by the NFL amounted to monopolization in
violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.'"
In holding that the NFL did not violate section 1 of the Sherman
Act, the court applied the Rule of Reason test." The Rule of Reason
test requires the court to determine "whether the restraint imposed
merely regulates and thereby promotes competition or is one that may
suppress or destroy competition."' 2 The critical factor in proving an
antitrust violation under this test is showing an anticompetitive intent
or effect.
13
6. The NFL had numerous problems: no collective bargaining agreement with the
Players Association had been in effect for two seasons, a district court had held several
player restrictions to be unlawful, another district court enjoined application of the "Rozelle
rule" by the NFL, third district court was considering a case attacking the NFL college
draft, the NFL Players Association threatened to challenge the procedures the NFL used to
man the new Tampa Bar and Seattle teams.
7. The NFL passed on March 17, 1976 the following resolution:
RESOLVED, after thorough review of the major problems presently confronting
the NFL, that the member clubs do not believe they can formally commit to spe-
cific expansion arrangements at this time. The clubs do, however, reaffirm their
desire to bring total League membership to thirty teams as soon as possible after
resolution of current problems and assimilation of the new Tampa Bay and Seattle
teams. At that time, Memphis and Birmingham, which have most actively sought
admission in recent months, will be among the cities receiving strongest considera-
tion for NFL franchises.
8. Id
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1 provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or other-
wise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, .... is de-
clared to be illegal."
10. 15 U.S.C. § 2 reads: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony."
11. Mid-South Grizzlies, 550 F. Supp. at 566-67.




The court first considered the effect of the NFL's action in denying
the Grizzlies a franchise. 4 In so doing, the court noted that the Griz-
zlies wanted to join with those unwilling to accept them, not to compete
with the NFL. Since the Grizzlies did not seek to become competitors
with the NFL, but sought to become partners, they could not have been
injured by any anticompetitive effect or behavior of the NFL.
The court considered professional sports a unique type of busi-
ness. 5 Professional teams in a league must not compete too well with
each other in a business sense. If all the teams competed as hard as
they could in business matters, then the financially stronger teams
would drive the weaker teams out-of-business. If this happened, not
only would the weaker teams fail, but eventually the whole league
would fail. Without a league no team could operate.
The court surmised that if the Grizzlies were to prevail in this legal
action, the receipt of a franchise would have a more anti-competitive
effect than the failure to obtain one.'6 If all acceptable applicants for
franchises were given one, then motivation to form a rival league
would be substantially hampered.
After deciding that the NFL's action did not have an anticompeti-
tive effect, the court then considered whether the NFL possessed an
anti-competitive intent. The court concluded the NFL acted fairly and
objectively in rejecting the Grizzlies' application at least three times
over a four-month period.'
7
The court found the failure of the NFL to consider the Grizzlies'
application on its merits irrelevant."8 The NFL had substantial busi-
ness reasons to justify its decision. The assimilation of two new teams
took three players from each existing team. Also, several lawsuits cre-
ated uncertainty as to the future of several NFL rules and policies.
Given these factors, the court reasoned that the decision not to expand
was a sound business judgment and not made with an anti-competitive
intent. 19
After finding no section 1 violation, the court considered whether
the NFL's behavior constituted an unlawful act of monopolization pro-
scribed by section 2 of the Sherman Act. Since the Grizzlies sought to
join the NFL, they were not rivals or potential rivals of the NFL in the
14. Id
15. Id at 566.
16. Id at 568.
17. Id at 568-69.
18. Id at 568.
19. Id at 569.
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business sense. Also, the NFL's actions did nothing to prevent the for-
mation of a rival league or the bringing of a team to Memphis, Tennes-
see. Therefore, the court concluded, as a matter of law, that no section
2 violation had been shown. 20
The court's decision in this case is sound. Here, the plaintiffs tried
to use the antitrust laws tojoin an alleged monopoly. The purpose of
antitrust laws is to promote competition. A finding for the plaintiff in
this case would be a misuse and subversion of the Sherman Act since it
would be contra to the purpose of the antitrust laws. Therefore, the
court's decision faithfully follows the statutory scheme it was asked to
interpret.
Although the court in refusing to find a violation of the Sherman
Act faithfully followed the purpose of the antitrust laws, the case is not
without significance. The case implicitly sets forth limitations on pro-
fessional sports leagues' franchise admission procedures. The court did
not stop after deciding that an anti-competitive effect did not exist. It
went further and scrutinized the business concerns faced by the NFL in
rejecting the Grizzlies' application. This suggests that if a league's ra-
tionale for refusing to consider or accept an application is unjustified,
then the court could find evidence of an anti-competitive intent.
Therefore, the court, by considering the soundness of the league's busi-
ness judgment, has set limitations on franchise admission procedures.
Paul Greiner
B. Constitutional Law
1. Boxer's Right to Fight for Championship Title
The United States District Court of New Jersey in Duva v. World
Boxing Association,' has held that a boxer has protectible property in-
terests in the ranking given to him by the World Boxing Association
(WBA) and in the opportunities accruing to him from that ranking.
Furthermore, the court held that action taken by a boxing association
with regulatory authority constituted "state action" to which the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would apply.2 Thus, in
20. Id at 571-72.
1. 548 F. Supp. 710 (D.N.J. 1982). The defendant, the World Boxing Association
(WBA), is an incorporated association of international boxing officials who promote and
regulate professional boxing throughout the world. Under Article IV of the Association's
constitution, all WBA officers must be "members in any official capacity of a National,
State, Provincial, or Municipal Boxing Authority." Id. at 713.
2. Id. at 716-18.
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arbitrarily depriving a boxer of his interests without giving him a
proper hearing to contest such an action, the association deprives a
boxer of his property without due process of law.
On February 2, 1982, Davey Moore defeated the WBA defending
Junior Middleweight Champion, Tadashi Mihara, and became recog-
nized as the new champion in that division. According to the WBA's
World Championships Regulation section 6, Moore was required to
defend his title "against the leading available contender in his weight
class, in accordance with the current rating list of the association,
within a period of ninety (90) days after the acquisition of this title."
3
However, prior to the Moore-Mihara fight, Moore had signed a con-
tract that was promoted and negotiated by Bob Arum Enterprises
(Arum), in which Moore agreed to fight Charlie Weir on April 24, 1982
in defense of his title, should Moore defeat Mihara. The Moore-Weir
fight was to take place in a new stadium in Johannesburg, South Africa
and was expected to draw 80,000 fans. The contract had been ap-
proved by WBA President Rodrigo Sanchez. The WBA had ranked
Weir the Number Four Contender in the Junior Middleweight
Division.
When the Moore-Weir fight plans were publicized, the Number
One Contender, Ayub Kalule, filed a protest claiming that under Regu-
lation section 6, Moore was required to fight him, not Weir. Later,
Kalule withdrew his protest when he signed a contract with Arum
which gave Kalule the right to fight the winner of the Moore-Weir fight
in June 1982.'
The Number Two Contender, Carlos Herrera, was apparently un-
available to fight Moore. The Number Three Contender, Plaintiff
Tony Ayala, Jr. and his managers, Plaintiffs Tony Ayala, Sr. and Louis
Duva informed the WBA, after Moore had defeated Mihara, that
Ayala Jr. was available to fight Moore.5 However, after finding out
about the Moore-Weir contract, Ayala filed suit to enjoin the WBA
from sanctioning the Moore-Weir fight, claiming that the fight violated
Regulation section 6.6
After Ayala fied suit, the WBA took steps to suspend Regulation
section 6. Regulation section 19 permitted the WBA to suspend other
WBA rules if such suspension was approved by a two-thirds vote of the
WBA Championships Committee, by the President, and by a majority
3. Id. at 714.
4. Id. at 715.
5. Id. at 714.
6. Id. at 715.
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vote of the WBA Executive Committee.7 On March 27, 1982, the two
committees ratified President Sanchez's decision to suspend Regulation
section 6 and sanction the Moore-Weir fight. Ayala's attorney ad-
dressed the Executive Committee for fifteen minutes prior to the vote,
but Ayala was given no other chance to represent himself before the
WBA. No reason was given by the committees or by Sanchez for the
decisions.8
In court, Ayala contended that as the Number Three Contender,
he had the right under Regulation section 6 to fight Moore for the
championship before Weir. Ayala claimed that by sanctioning the
Moore-Weir fight, the WBA had deprived him of a property interest
without due process of law. The WBA responded by asserting that
Regulation section 19 gave it the right to suspend Regulation section 6.
In addition, the WBA referred to the fact that Regulation section 6
specifically required the division champion to defend his title against
"the leading available contender."9 Therefore, the WBA argued that
Regulation section 6, by its wording, only gave a protectible property
interest to the Number One Contender, Kalule. Furthermore, since
Kalule had waived his right to fight Moore, Moore could fight whom-
ever he wished. Arum, as intervenor in the suit, claimed that even if
Ayala had a protectible property interest, the suspension of Regulation
section 6 was a justifiable accommodation of the public's wishes.' °
The court ruled that in order for Ayala to successfully assert a
claim that he was deprived of property without due process of law, he
must show that the WBA's actions were, in fact, government actions,
that Ayala's interest was a property interest protectible under the Four-
teenth Amendment, and that the WBA deprived him of this property
without due process."
In determining whether the WBA's action constituted government
action, the court stated that the Due Process Clause applies only to
state action.' 2 The court acknowledged that the WBA was a private
organization and citing the Third Circuit decision of Magill v.
Avonworth Baseball Conference,"3 stated that there were three types of
instances where ostensibly private action was, in fact, performed by the
7. Id. at 714.
8. Id. at 716.
9. Id. at 712.
10. Id. at 712-13.
11. Id. at 716.
12. Id. (citing Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)).
13. 548 F. Supp. at 716 (citing Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conference, 516 F.2d 1328,
1331 (3d Cir. 1975)).
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state: state enforcement of a private agreement, significant state in-
volvement with a private party, and private performance of a govern-
ment function. The court noted that the regulation of boxing had long
been a government function in New Jersey and elsewhere in the United
States.14 Furthermore, the court noted that all WBA officers and com-
mittee chairmen were required to be officials of some government box-
ing authority and that the several government bodies represented in the
WBA had delegated much of their regulatory power to the WBA.' 5
For this reason, the court felt that the WBA's action constituted state
action under the second and third Magill tests.' 6
In determining whether Ayala had a protectible property interest,
the court said that such interests "are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings. . . that secure certain ben-
efits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits."' 7 The
court said that Ayala's WBA Number Three ranking and WBA Regu-
lation section 6 created property interests because they were rules guar-
anteeing Ayala the chance to fight for the Championship before a
lower-ranked boxer could.18
The court rejected the WBA's argument that the words "leading
available contender" in Regulation section 6 only gave a protectible
property interest to the Number One Contender, Kalule, and that
Kalule's waiver of this interest destroyed all obligations on the part of
Moore and the WBA. It held that this interpretation was inconsistent
with the WBA's declared purpose of protecting the interests of all box-
ers, since under such an interpretation, promoters could severely dam-
age the expectations of deserving top-ranked boxers merely by buying
off the Number One contender and thereby securing his agreement that
the Champion fight anyone whom the promoters wished him to fight. ' 9
The court decided that the term "leading available contender" must
protect the property interests of all of the next available ranked boxers
once the leading contender became unavailable to fight for the title.2°
Finally, the court found that the WBA's denial of Ayala's property
interest had taken place without procedural and substantive due pro-
cess of law.2' Although Ayala's attorney was allowed to speak briefly
14. 548 F. Supp. at 717.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 716-17.
17. Id. at 718, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
18. 548 F. Supp. at 718-19.
19. Id. at 719.
20. Id. at 720.
21. Id. at 720-23.
1984]
LO YOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
before the Executive Committee, Ayala had been given no chance to
object to the WBA's decision to allow a lower-ranked boxer to fight for
the championship. Nor was he given a reason for the WBA's decision
to suspend Regulation section 6. This was a deprivation of procedural
due process since under Kent v. United States,22 procedural due process
requires, at a minimum, an opportunity for the injured party to be
heard before losing his property and a statement by the decision-maker
of the reasons for the unfavorable outcome.
According to the court, an association provides substantive due
process when it exercises its regulatory authority "in a non-arbitrary
manner consistent with the purpose of its regulations."23 The WBA's
use of Regulation section 19 to suspend Regulation section 6 was ap-
parently a sacrifice of Ayala's property rights for the sake of the WBA's
and Arum's financial gain. The court felt that this was an impermissi-
ble reason to deprive Ayala of his property interests and therefore an
arbitrary exercise of authority.24 The court also stated that the WBA's
action was inconsistent with the stated purpose of the WBA Regula-
tions of protecting the interests of its contending fighters.25 For these
reasons, the court ruled that the WBA had deprived Ayala of property
without due process of law.2 6 On the basis of this decision, the court
entered a permanent injunction directing the WBA to revoke its sanc-
tion of the Moore-Weir fight.27
This case is of little significance in the area of due process. Un-
questionably, if the WBA deprived Ayala of a protectible property in-
terest, its failure to give Ayala a genuine opportunity to protest its
action and its refusal to give a reason for its action deprived Ayala of
procedural due process.28
At trial, the WBA and Arum argued that the WBA's actions were
justified because there was a stronger public interest in Moore's fighting
Weir than in his fighting Ayala.29 But denial of an individual's interest
because of public opinion was held to be an arbitrary deprivation of his
interest and therefore a violation of substantive due process of law in
22. 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966).
23. 548 F. Supp. at 721, 723.
24. Id. at 721-23.
25. Id. at 721, 723.
26. Id. at 720-23.
27. Id. at 723-25. The court felt that it could not enjoin the Moore-Weir fight altogether
and stated that its action against the WBA was sufficient to protect Ayala's championship
interests.
28. 383 U.S. at 553.
29. 548 F. Supp. at 722.
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Winsett v. McGinnes.3° The WBA did not bother to argue that it had
given Ayala due process. Its failure to do so was apparently predicated
on its belief that its action was not "state action" and that Ayala had no
property interest under Regulation section 6. 3'
It is in the issues of "state action" and "property interests" that this
case is of great importance. In deciding that a voluntary athletic organ-
ization which regulates the conduct of athletes in a particular sport
could constitute "state action", the Duva court has created a split be-
tween itself and other federal courts around the country over this issue.
The Duva court compared the WBA to the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) and noted that virtually every court which has
ruled on the matter has ruled that NCAA activities constitute state
action.32
Not all courts have extended the NCAA cases to situations involv-
ing other athletic organizations. In DeFrantz v. USOC,3 3 a number of
athletes sought an injunction prohibiting the United States Olympic
Committee (USOC) from carrying out its resolution not to send an
American team to participate in the 1980 Summer Olympic Games in
Moscow. In support of its position that the USOC's action was state
action, the plaintiffs noted that the USOC was a federally chartered
organization,34 and they argued that its resolution occurred as a result
of intense pressure put upon it by the federal government.35
The DeFrantz court disagreed with the plaintiffs contention that
government pressure put upon the USOC constituted government ac-
tion. Citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority 36 and Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Company,37 it held that the government would
have either had to insinuate itself into a position of interdependence
30. 617 F.2d 996, 1007 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Anderson v. Win-
sett, 449 U.S. 1093 (1981).
31. 548 F. Supp. at 720.
32. Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 1974), Howard
Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213, 217-20 (D.C. Cir. 1972), Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028,
1031-32 (5th Cir. 1975).
33. 492 F. Supp. 1181 (D.D.C. 1980).
34. Id. at 1187.
35. Id. at 1193. President Carter had threatened to take legal action under the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. § 1701-06) to enforce his decision to
boycott the Games. The Act would have given him the power to prohibit the sending of an
American team to the Games by issuing appropriate regulations violations of which would
be punishable by civil and criminal penalties (§ 1704-05). Carter had also discussed the
possibility of removing the USOC's tax-exempt status if it refused to comply with his
decision.
36. 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
37. 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
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with the USOC or to have created a sufficiently close nexus between
itself and the USOC so that the USOC's action could be created as the
action of the government itself.38 Referring to the exclusive jurisdiction
granted to the USOC over matters related to participation in the
Games,39 the DeFrantz court held that the plaintiffs failed to demon-
strate a sufficiently close relationship between the USOC and the fed-
eral government. The Court stated that the government might have the
power to prevent the athletes from participating in the Olympics, but
not to force the USOC to vote in a certain way.4 °
Although government influence seems to have played as great a
role in the USOC's action in DeFrantz as it did in the WBA's action in
Duva, state action was found in Duva and not in DeFrantz. This indi-
cates that there is a conflict between the lines of thought stemming
from the two cases.
At least one other circuit has held DeFrantz to be controlling on
this issue. Lafler v. Athletic Board of Control4' involved a situation sim-
ilar to Duva. The plaintiff alleged that the Michigan Athletic Board of
Control denied her a constitutional right to fight in amateur boxing
competition. The federal district court in the Sixth Circuit found that
the Michigan Athletic Board of Control had acquiesced in the United
States of America Amateur Boxing Federation's (USA/ABF) enforce-
ment of its own rules and that this did not constitute state action under
DeFrantz.42 The fact that such acquiescence was held to constitute
state action in Duva is another fact which underlies the tension between
Duva and DeFrantz.
Both the Duva and DeFrantz analyses of the "state action" issues
are flawed. The Duva court relied heavily on New Jersey law in ruling
that the WBA's regulation of boxing constituted private performance of
a government function since the regulation of boxing had long been an
exclusive state activity.43 But this exclusivity does not exist in most ju-
risdictions. Most jurisdictions explicitly refuse to regulate boxing
matches sponsored by a United States amateur boxing association; such
38. 492 F. Supp. at 1193.
39. Id. at 1194, 36 U.S.C. § 374(3).
40. 492 F. Supp. at 1194.
41. 536 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
42. Id. at 105-06.
43. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:2-5 (West. Supp. 1982). "The commissioner shall have and
exercise sole . . . supervision over all boxing . . . performances"; see also, Laurel Sports
Activities Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 135 N.J.L. 234, 51 A.2d 233
(1947), aff7d 136 N.J.L. 637, 57 A.2d 387 (1948).
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regulatory authority rests entirely with the association."4 So the Duva
court's statement that a private organization's regulation of boxing con-
stitutes private performance of a state function can only be applied cor-
rectly to cases involving professional boxing since the regulation of
professional boxing traditionally has been an exclusive state activity. 5
It cannot be applied correctly to cases involving amateur boxing since
the states by statute generally have given exclusive regulatory authority
over amateur boxing to private organizations.46
For a similar reason, the DeFrantz court was correct in stating that
the USOC was not a private party performing a public function in light
of the fact that the USOC had been given exclusive jurisdiction over all
matters relating to participation in the Games.47 However, if the Duva
definition of state action was too broad, the DeFrantz definition was
too narrow. The DeFrantz court failed to consider the possibility that
the USOC action might have arisen as a result of significant govern-
ment involvement with the USOC even if the USOC could not prop-
erly be considered to be a private performer of an exclusive
government function. Significant state involvement with a private
party constitutes state action under Burton.48 Furthermore, the Duva
court, following a long line of authority,49 correctly noted that NCAA
activity constitutes state action because the numerous public institu-
tions that comprise its membership constitutes such significant involve-
ment.5 The Duva court also noted that the WBA was composed
entirely of public officials," and its finding of significant state involve-
ment with the WBA was based on the application of the cases involving
the NCAA to its analysis.
5 2
44. Michigan is one of these states. See Mich. Stat. Ann. § 18.425(804) (Callaghan
1972). The Lafler court, which was ruling on a Michigan case, should have based its deci-
sion on the fact that Michigan authorities were statutorily prohibited from regulating a
USA/ABF match and not on the misstatement that they had merely acquiesced to the
USA/ABF's actions. See also, West Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 18651 (1964), N.Y. Unconsol-
idated Law § 8931 (McKinney 1974), Nev. Rev. Stat. § 467.170 (1979).
45. Cf. 4 Am. Jur. 2d Amusements & Exhibitions § 27 (1962) ("Statutes have been
passed in many states making prizefighting a crime and where those statutes are still in
effect, it is a crime except insofar as it has been legalized as by . . . permitting contests
between amateurs or by permitting prizefighting when licensed by a state or other govern-
mental regulatory body").
46. Id.
47. 36 U.S.C. § 374(3).
48. 365 U.S. at 725.
49. Howard, 510 F.2d at 217-20, Parish, 506 F.2d at 1031-32, Wright v. Arkansas Activi-
ties Assoc., 501 F.2d 25 (8th Cir. 1974).
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Public institutions also comprise much of the membership of the
USOC.53 The DeFrantz court's failure to use the NCAA cases to find
significant state involvement with the USOC was the fatal flaw from
which its decision of "no state action" resulted.
In ruling that Ayala had a protectible property interest, the Duva
court touched upon another issue which had been dealt with before in
cases concerning amateur athletics. The standard used to determine
whether an individual has a constitutionally protectible property inter-
est has been set down by the companion cases Board of Regents v.
Roth15 4 and Perry v. Sindermann." Both cases involved non-tenured
college professors who had been dismissed from their positions without
a hearing. The professor in Roth had specifically been hired only for a
fixed term of one year. The Court ruled that since he had been given
no assurances of continued employment, the professor's claim of enti-
tlement to it did not reach the level of a property right.56 However, the
professor in Perry had been employed for ten years in a state college
system which had no official tenure system but impliedly gave tenure to
its professors who had been employed for seven years or longer. The
Court ruled in favor of the professor here, distinguishing this case from
Roth by stating that the Perry professor's understanding with the uni-
versity gave him a property interest in re-employment while the Roth
professor had no such understanding. 7 Under Roth and Perry, a con-
stitutionally protectible property interest exists if the individual has a
reasonable expectation in a benefit created by a rule or mutually ex-
plicit understanding."
WBA Regulation section 6 seems to be the type of rule which
would give some sort of expectation to Ayala under Perry. But this
does not resolve the question of whether the benefits Ayala might re-
ceive from competition are certain enough to make his expectation of
benefit a reasonable one, giving him a protectible property interest.
Legal commentators have strongly supported the notion that an
amateur athlete has a constitutionally protectible property interest in
the right to compete in his chosen sport.59 However, the courts have
53. Nafziger, Amateur Sports Act, 1 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 71 (1983).
54. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
55. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
56. 408 U.S. at 577-78.
57. 408 U.S. at 600-01.
58. 408 U.S. at 601-02.
59. Keyes, The NCAA Amateurism and the Student-Athlete's Constitutional Rights Upon
Ineligibility, 15 New. Eng. L. Rev. 597 (1980), Riegel & Hanley, Judicial Review of NCAA
Decisions: Does the College Athlete Have a Property Interest in Interscholastic Athletics?, 10
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generally held that a high-school athlete has no such interest6" and they
have been cool to the idea of a college athlete having such an interest.6 '
One argument which has been used to justify the viewpoint that a col-
lege athlete's right to compete is a property interest is that intercollegi-
ate competition serves as a pre-professional training ground.62  The
courts have acknowledged that substantial economic rewards may be at
stake when collegiate athletics is looked on as a prelude to professional
competition.63 Yet, the consensus of opinion is that a college athlete's
interest in a future professional career seems too speculative to consti-
tute a property right.' 4
This fact is significant in determining whether the Duva court was
correct in holding that Ayala had a protectible property interest in his
right to fight. For if the courts rule against college athletes solely on
the ground that their interest in the rewards of a professional career is
too speculative to constitute a property interest under Roth, they can
hardly extend these rulings to cases involving professional athletes such
as Ayala who have clearly worked their way into a position where they
can receive such rewards. Obviously, Ayala, who was ranked Number
Three Contender for the WBA Junior Middleweight World Champion-
ship, had an interest in competing which was more than speculative.
Applying the decisions on the property rights of amateur athletics to
Stetson L. Rev. 483 (1981), Shuck, Administration of Amateur Athletics. The Timefor an
Amateur Athlete's Bill of Rights Has Arrived, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 53 (1979).
60. Albach v. Odle, 531 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1976), Hamilton v. Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Association, 552 F.2d 681 (6th Cir. 1976), Mitchell v. Louisiana High School
Athletic Association, 430 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1970).
61. Dr. H. Appenzeller, Athletics and the Law 219-20 (1975), Shuck at 75-6, Riegel &
Hanley at 491-99. Cases which have held that a college athlete has no such right or which
have expressed doubt as to the existence of such a right include Howard, Parrish, and Colo-
rado Seminary v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885 (D. colo. 1976), arfd, 570 F.2d 320 (10th Cir.
1978). Cases which have upheld such a property interest on behalf of a college athlete or
have indicated that such an interest may exist include Behagen v. Intercollegiate Conference
of Faculty Representatives, 346 F. Supp. 602 (D. Minn. 1972), Regents of the University of
Minnesota v. NCAA, 422 F. supp. 1158 (D. Minn. 1976), rev'd 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1977),
cert. dismissed 434 U.S. 978 (1977). (Federal district court recognized a protectible property
right; court of appeals reversed on other grounds and did not reach this question), and
Buckton v. NCAA, 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass 1973) (Ineligibility for participation in col-
legiate athletics constituted irreparable harm for which injunctive relief could be granted).
62. Springer, A Student Athlete's Interest in Eligibility: Its Context and Constitutional
Dimensions, 10 Conn. L. Rev. 318, 342-43 (1978).
63. See Behagan, 346 F. Supp. at 604.
64. Springer at 342-43, Parish, 506 F.2d at 1034, Colorado Seminary, 417 F. Supp. at
895. In questioning the reasoning of the court in Behagen, Springer finds it significant that
Behagen was decided before Roth.
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Ayala's case gives Ayala a protectible property interest in fighting
professionally.
Moreover, there is one case preceding Duva which touched upon
the right of the professional athlete to compete. This case also involved
a professional boxer. The Duva court, however, failed to cite it. In
1970, a United States District Court in New York enjoined the New
York State Athletic Commission from denying Muhammed Ali the
right to box in New York State because of Ali's conviction for draft
evasion." In doing so, the court stated, "[d]enial of a license to box has
barred Ali from pursuing in New York his chosen trade from which he
earned his living for most of his adult years . . .with but a limited
number of years remaining in which he can meet the rigorous physical
standards essential to engaging in such activity. It is clear that unless
preliminary relief is granted, he will suffer irreparable injury.
," 66
Obviously the A/i court felt that Ali's right to fight professionally
was a constitutionally protectible interest. But since Ali preceded Roth
and Perry, the A/i court did not refer to any rule or understanding
which Roth and Perry say must exist in order for a protectible property
interest to exist. However, Duva keeps the Ali rule intact after Roth
and Perry by recognizing such a rule in WBA Regulation section 6.67
Clearly, the Duva court was correct in ruling that the WBA's activ-
ities constituted state action. This is because the regulation of profes-
sional boxing traditionally has been an exclusive state function and
because of significant involvement in the WBA of public authorities.
It is also clear that an athlete who is in a position where he can
readily utilize his skills for economic benefit has a protectible property
interest in being able to do so, as long as there is some rule or under-
standing governing the relationship between himself and another party
which places him in such a position.
65. Muhammed Ali v. Division of State Athletic Comm'n, 316 F. Supp. 1246 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
66. Id. at 1253.
67. 548 F. Supp. at 718-20. Another similarity between Afi and Duva was the fact that
Aft involved a claim of due process similar to that in Duva. 316 F. Supp. at 1248. TheAli
court recognized that a state athletic commission has the power to deny a boxing license to
an individual for conviction of a felony but found that the state boxing commission had in at
least 244 previous instances granted, renewed, or reinstated boxing licenses to applicants
who had been convicted of felonies, misdemeanors, or military offenses involving moral
turpitude. Id. at 1249. The court felt that revoking Ali's boxing license because of his
conviction for draft evasion, under the circumstances, was an arbitrary, capricious, and in-
vidious act and therefore was a denial of due process. Since Duva found that arbitrary,
capricious, and invidious activity on the WBA's part constituted a due process violation, its
failure to cite A/i for support on this issue is an example of carelessness on the court's part.
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Duva does not create any new law with respect to these issues, but
to some extent, it breaks new ground in applying existing law (as set
down in cases dealing with amateur sports) to professional sports.
However, even if other courts follow Duva in protecting a professional
athlete's right to compete from being arbitrarily taken away by a body
significantly involved with a public authority, the law concerning such
matters is still likely to remain uncertain for the near future. Courts
will be required to analyze their cases in the same way that the Duva
court did, by examining the issues of state action, due process, and
property interest. Furthermore, serious doubt exists as to whether the
activities of purely private organizations which involve sports not regu-
lated by the government (i.e., baseball's Major Leagues, the National
Football League, the National Basketball Association, and the Na-
tional Hockey League) constitute state action.68
In addition, an athlete's property interest in competition may be
quite fragile since such an interest is not created by the Constitution
but by existing rules of understandings that stem from another source,
such as WBA Regulation section 6. Rules and regulations can be re-
pealed and they can also be challenged as unlawful or unconstitutional.
Most of the litigation involving professional athletes involves the issue
of whether a rule promulgated by a sports organization has infringed a
player's right to sell his services to the highest bidder in violation of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act.69 The Act declares that "Every restraint of
trade or commerce among the several states . . . is declared to be ille-
gal."7 It has been held to apply to all professional sports except base-
ball.7 ' Arguably, a regulation such as WBA Regulation section 6
68. L.S. Sobel, Professional Sports & The Law, 435-36 (1977). At least two legal com-
mentators have noted that private sports franchises generally lease municipally-owned stadi-
ums and rely on the states for services such as construction of transportation facilities and
provision of law enforcement personnel for security. They argue that this level of state
involvement creates a sufficient basis for a court to find state action involved in the opera-
tion of these private organizations. See Falk & Scheler, The Professional Athlete and the
First Amendment:. A Question ofJudicial Intervention, 4 Hofstra L. Rev. 417, 422-32 (1976)
and Discipline in Professional Sports.- The Needfor Player Protection, 60 Georgetown L.J.
771, 790-92 (1972).
69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, 81 Legal Almanac Series, P.S. Sloan, The Athlete and the Law 74
(1983).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
71. United States v. Int'l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955), Radovich v. Nat'l Football
League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957), Haywood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
Baseball's exemption was upheld as recently as 1972 in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
Since there appears to be no reason to distinguish baseball from other sports for the pur-
poses of anti-trust analysis, the exemption is considered by legal commentators to be anach-
ronistic. See Sobel, 30-82, McClelland, Flood in the Land ofAntitrust: Another Look at
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constitutes such a restraint of trade since it forbids a division champion
from fighting any boxer other than the leading contender in the boxer's
division.
In the future, if athletes such as Ayala are accorded rights under
an applicable rule or regulation, it is quite likely that other athletes
such as Davey Moore, who are thereby prevented from competing, will
challenge that rule or regulation as being an illegal restraint of trade
under the Sherman Act.72
Mark Siegel
ProfessionalAthletics, the Antitrust Laws and the Labor Law Exemption, 7 Ind. L. Rev. 541,
541-46 (1974).
72. Actually, in the end, the WBA was not restrained from sanctioning the Moore-Weir
fight. On April 23, three days after the District Court decision and the day before the sched-
uled Moore-Weir title bout, Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit stayed the district court's injunction which prevented the WBA from
sanctioning the fight. The Moore-Weir fight took place as scheduled on April 24 in Johan-
nesburg, South Africa. Moore knocked Weir out in the fifth round and was proclaimed
WBA Junior Middleweight Champion. Since then, no action has been taken by the Third
Circuit concerning this case. If it has maintained jurisdiction over it, it can still strip the
Junior Middleweight Champion of his title. See New York Times, April 27, 1982, at C8,
col. 5-6. Since the federal district court's decision has not been decided on its merits in the
Circuit Court of Appeals, it remains good law. Cf. Hixon v. Durbin, 560 F. Supp. 654, 660
(E.D. Penn. 1983).
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